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Abstract
In an attempt to reduce the number of adjudicated juveniles being com-
mitted to the state for placement, the juvenile court in Wayne CountyMichigan
implemented three intensive supervision programs to serve as alternatives
to commitment. A four-year, randomized evaluation of the programs found
them to be cost-effective. An analysis of court processes, however, suggested
that the programs gradually came to supplement rather than to displace com-
mitments as intended. The results of this study illustrate how juvenile justice
organizations adapt to the presence of alternative programs in ways that
dilute their impact.
Introduction
Criminal justice policy makers and researchers often advocate intensive
supervision programs as a means of guarding the public safety and enhancing
rehabilitative outcomes while avoiding or reducing the costs of incarceration.
The appeal of claims made for these programs created a wave of support
for intensive supervision programs during recent years (Clear & Har-
dyman, 1990). Yet, the success of the programs as alternatives to incar-
ceration is far from clear and may be limited to specific circumstances related
to their conceptualization, political support, and implementation (Peter-
silia, 1990).
In 1983, the Wayne County (Michigan) Juvenile Court initiated three in-
tensive supervision programs as alternatives to state commitment for a sub-
stantial number of adjudicated youths. An evaluation study found
the programs to be cost-effective (Barton & Butts, 1990). Yet, as the fol-
lowing analysis demonstrates, the introduction of the alternative programs did
not reduce juvenile commitments to the extent intended. The impact of
intensive supervision as an alternative was constrained by a number of factors,
including accommodations within the juvenile justice system itself.
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The Programs
Other than transferring a juvenile offender to the adult system, the
most restrictive disposition available to Michigan juvenile courts is commit-
ment to the state Department of Social Services (DSS). The majority (80
percent) of juveniles committed to Michigan’s DSS are placed in training
schools or comparable private institutions.
During the early 1980s, state and local officials were concerned about the
number of juvenile commitments originating in Wayne County, a large
urban county that includes the city of Detroit. More than 700 youths were
committed to DSS from Wayne County in 1982, a higher per capita rate
than that of any other Michigan county. In response to this disproportionate
utilization, the state adopted an explicit policy goal of reducing Wayne County
commitments to 500 per year beginning in 1983. The county, in turn, im-
plemented three alternative programs to supervise a portion of the youths
who otherwise would have been committed. It was hoped that many com-
mitment-bound juveniles could be retained in the community if they were
provided with close behavioral supervision and other services.
The three alternative programs differed in their philosophical orientations,
but each provided intensive supervision services involving small caseloads
and frequent client contact. The Intensive Probation Unit (IPU) was operated
by the juvenile court. The Comprehensive Youth Training and Community
Involvement Program (CYTCIP) and the home-based services program
of Michigan Human Services, Inc. (MHS) were private agencies under con-
tract to the court. All three programs used a variable mix of in-
dividual, group, and family counseling; educational and vocational
support; recreation; and behavioral supervision. Each program worker was
responsible for about 10 youths. The programs were designed so that each
youth would be worked with for one year.
Implementation of the alternative programs included an evaluation to deter-
mine cost-effectiveness. For two years, every youth the court recommended
for state commitment was screened for eligibility and then randomly assigned
to one of the three programs or to a control group.2 The juveniles diverted
to intensive supervision (n=326) had their commitment recommendations
rescinded but remained on probationary status. The youths comprising the
control group (n=185) were committed to the state, just as they would have
been without the evaluation’s random assignment. The evaluation found
the randomization process to be successful in dividing the 511 study youths
into equivalent groups.
Each case was followed for two years after randomization. Data were ob-
tained by interviewing the youths, their parents, and program staff, as well
as examining various court and agency records. The major finding of
the Wayne County evaluation was that, in terms of recidivism and other
measures, the outcomes of intensive supervision were nearly identical to
those of commitment, whereas intensive supervision cost one third as much
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as commitment to the state (see Barton & Butts (1990) for a complete dis-
cussion).
The intensive supervision programs appeared to be cost-effective alterna-
tives to commitment. Yet, their value was diminished by organizational adap-
tations within the juvenile justice system. The programs initially achieved
the goal of reducing commitments to 500 per year, but commitments soon
cyept back to well over 600. Why did this happen? Was the court faced with
an overall increase in cases, or did it recommend commitment for a
higher proportion of cases after the intensive supervision programs became
available? Patterns in court processing suggest the latter: when the rate of
commitments is analyzed as a function of the volume of petitions filed in
the juvenile court, commitments increasingly exceeded expectations. Given
an increase in the number of recommended commitments, did the number
of youths eligible for diversion increase beyond the new programs’ capacity
to accept them, thus preventing a reduction in commitments? Or, did the
screening criteria change so that the proportion of eligible youths declined?
The analysis below demonstrates that both trends occurred as the juvenile
justice system adapted to the presence of the programs.
Organizational Context
The system’s inability to maintain a reduction in commitments could
have been the result of many factors. It did not appear to be an intention-
al subversion of policy. More likely, it was the product of organization-
al forces that combined to thwart the good intentions of the court and the
state. Policy makers who initiate alternative programs must contend with
social, political, and economic factors that can influence program outcomes.
They confront particularly acute pressures from fiscal constraints and their
(not necessarily accurate) perception that the public favors a strict law and
order approach to juvenile crime (Cullen, Cullen & Wozniak, 1988; Galvin
& Polk, 1983; Steinhart, 1988). There are also significant organizational in-
centives for juvenile justice systems to avoid implementing true alternatives
(Thomson, 1990; Tonry, 1990).
Organizational behaviors are shaped by resource scarcity, competition with
other organizations, cultural values and norms, and the overall politi-
cal climate. These factors are part of the organization’s environment. Seem-
ingly aberrant organizational behaviors may be logical when considered from
an environmental perspective. Sociologists such as Selznick (1949)
and Gouldner (1954) were among the first to show how organizations survive
by adapting to the environment. As organizations grow more complex, they
become institutionalized: their activities focus on growth and survival as
well as on the attainment of their official goals (Messinger, 1955; Zald &
Denton, 1963). Organizational structures and processes are in some part
a manifestation of prior efforts to establish predictability in the environ-
ment and to manage dependence on external resources (Aldrich, 1979; Child,
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1972; Emery & Trist, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967).
Organizational resources typically include money, staff, clients, authority,
and autonomy. To the juvenile justice system in Wayne County, the com-
mitment of juveniles was related to several valued resources. Transfer-
ring serious juvenile offenders to state custody (with state-funded supervision
and placement) allowed the system to direct its energies and resources to
larger numbers of delinquent youths. In fact, the original impetus for the
intensive supervision programs was that smaller Michigan counties were per-
turbed by Wayne County’s disproportionate utilization of the finite commit-
ment slots provided by DSS.
The addition of the intensive supervision programs was clearly beneficial to
the Wayne County system. The system could benefit even more, however,
by implementing the new programs while retaining the original level of com-
mitment resources. Over time, the system managed to achieve this outcome
through several internal adaptations. One adaptation was to increase the
number of recommended commitments. Another adaptation was to modify
various post-commitment factors, such as increasing lengths of stay in the
programs and preventing cases from being diverted to the programs by
&dquo;rehearing&dquo; them in court. The following analysis demonstrates how these
adaptations effectively restored the rate of Wayne County commitments
despite the introduction of the alternative programs.
Increasing Commitment Recommendations
In order to determine whether commitment recommendations increased in
response to the new programs, it is necessary to estimate what the commitment
rate would have been in the absence of the in-home programs. The procedure
developed for this estimation relies upon the simple assumption that the
number of juvenile court commitments should vary directly with the number of
petitions filed in the court and with the proportion of serious charges contained
in those petitions. Admittedly, this assumption does not account for the
complexity of courtroom decisions. However, if the commitment rate
is found not to vary predictably with the rate of petitions and serious charges
coming before the court, then non-offense factors must be affecting the com-
mitment rate. While not the only explanation, the availability of
more programming spaces (the addition of the alternative programs) must
be considered one of the more plausible reasons for an increasing rate of com-
mitment recommendations.
The first four rows of Table 1 contain information provided by the Wayne
County Juvenile Court for each year between 1981 and 1986, indicating the
number of delinquency petitions filed, the proportion of charges for criminal
offenses (excluding status offenses, curfew violations, etc.), the number of
petitions weighted by the proportion of criminal charges, and the number
of commitments. The next two rows show the commitment rate as a propor-
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tion of all petitions and as a proportion of petitions weighted by criminal
charges.
The last two rows in Table 1 use the pooled pre-program data from 1981 and
1982 to estimate the number of commitments that would have been made
in each subsequent year had the programs not been introduced. For example,
the average proportion of all delinquency petitions resulting in commitments
in 1981 and 1982 was .128 (the average of .123 for 1981 and .133 for 1982).
Applying this pooled estimator to the number of 1983 petitions (5,639) yields
an estimated 722 commitments that would have been made in 1983 without
the programs. Subsequent estimates projected 652 commitments in 1984, 692
in 1985, and 724 in 1986. Basing the estimate on the number of petitions for
criminal charges, on the other hand, yields a slightly different figure. In
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1986, for example, this method projects that there would have been 713 com-
mitments in the absence of the alternative programs. In fact, 646 commit-
ments were made in 1986. Thus, the programs appear to have reduced
1986 commitments by somewhere between 67 and 78 cases, depending upon
which estimation method is used (i.e., the difference between 646 and either
713 or 724).
If intensive supervision was used as a true alternative for commitment-
bound youths, the number of cases entering the programs should roughly
match the estimated reduction in commitments. If the number of youths
entering the programs exceeds the estimate, the excess constitutes an increase
in the commitment rate. Table 2 shows the extent of this increase for each
year following the introduction of the in-home alternatives. The first row
shows the number of cases entering the in-home programs each year. The
second row contains the estimates of reduced commitments based upon the
data in Table 1.
Table 2
:The difference between the number entering the programs and the reduc-
tion in commitments is presented in the third row of Table 2. The dif-
ference grows each year following the introduction of the programs, from
about 20 cases in 1983, to 42 cases in 1984, 50 cases in 1985, and 78 cases
in 1986. This steady increase suggests that the juvenile justice system gradual-
ly accommodated the presence of the alternative programs by increasing
the likelihood of a commitment recommendation prior to screening for pro-
gram eligibility. Coupled with the changes discussed in the next section,
this accommodation appears to have diluted the impact of the intensive su-
pervision programs.
Modifying Post-Commitment Factors
A higher rate of commitment recommendations cannot account entirely
for the resurgence in actual commitments coming from Wayne County.
Juvenile court processes that occur after the initial commitment recommen-
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dation (e.g., eligibility screening and program assignment) &dquo;feed back&dquo; into
the system and helped maintain the rate of actual commitments by restricting
access to the programs. Together, these processes made intensive supervision
available to a decreasing proportion of commitment-bound youths in the
years following the inception of the alternative programs.
Table 3 presents summary data regarding program diversions and com-
mitments for the five calendar years following the introduction of
the programs. The total number of commitment recommendations increased
from around 700 to over 800 per year. Actual commitments ranged from
510 to 535 per year between 1983 and 1985, closely approaching the County’s
target level of 500 per year. The rates then jumped to 652 in 1986 and 638
in 1987. Although the three programs increased their combined capacity
from 150 youths initially to about 200 in late 1985, the number of cases
Table 3
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actually entering the programs was less than 170 in every year except 1985.
The intended reduction in commitments was limited by three additional fac-
tors : lengths of stay in the programs, discretionary eligibility exclusions, and
&dquo;rehearings.&dquo;
Length Of Stay
The programs were originally designed to work with youths for about
one year. Case turnover quickly became problematic, however, and many
youths received more than a year of intensive supervision. In the first two
years, this extended retention produced few problems because the demand
for program spaces was limited by the assignment of some eligible cases to
the control group. Extended program stays may have actually helped the
programs maintain adequate caseloads during this time. By 1985, however,
demand for the programs exceeded available spaces.
One response might have been a reduction in average length of stay, but
this did not occur. During the first year of program assignments, just over
33 percent of the cases entering the programs were retained for longer than
twelve months. During the second year, all three programs showed an in-
crease in the number of cases being retained for more than a year, from
one-third to nearly half of all cases. In 1985, IPU and CYTCIP reduced
the percentage of these cases, but MHS continued to keep more youths (about
53 percent of all their cases) for lengthy stays. Overall, about 44 percent
of the 1985 cases and 43 percent of 1986 cases remained active for more
than one year.
When one considers that about half of the cases entering the programs failed
(i.e., were re-arrested or otherwise terminated before completing the program),
and that most of these failures occurred in less than a year, the length-of-stay
patterns mean that the programs elected to retain the rest of their cases far
longer than the 12-month target. The evaluation estimated that the programs
retained between 60 and 70 percent of their successful cases for more than
a year. Despite the possible merits of lengthy stays, they restricted access
to intensive supervision for other youths coming through the system. As
of 1985, the lack of program capacity created a log-jam at the point of
program screening, thereby encouraging the use of other adaptive
mechanisms.
Rehearings And Discretionary Screening
During the experimental phase (the first two years of program operation),
the eligibility criteria were fairly explicit, excluding cases with no adequate
home (active neglect cases), violent offenses, severe psychiatric disturbances,
etc. In the first year, parents were given the opportunity to refuse diversion
prior to case screening and many did, as seen in Table 3 (21 percent of all
cases, and up to 40 percent of those who would otherwise have been eligible).
About 32 percent of all cases screened in the first year were deemed eligible,
although random assignments to the control group meant that not all eligible
’t +
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cases were assigned to the programs. Thus, about one-fourth (24 percent)
of all cases actually entered the programs in 1983. Commitments totaled 535
for the year.
Procedures were altered in the second year, eliminating the pre-screen-
ing option of parental refusal. Parents could still refuse to accept the
youth’s diversion to intensive supervision, however, by filing for a rehearing
of the case shortly after notification of the court’s intent. Only 28 parents filed
for rehearings in 1984. As a result, the eligibility rate increased to 43 percent.
Since random assignments to the evaluation’s control group continued, the
proportion actually entering the programs did not increase markedly. The
total number of commitment recommendations fell from 701 to 667, and
the number of actual commitments was similarly reduced to nearly 500.
As planned, random assignments into the evaluation study ceased early
in 1985, and case screening responsibility was transferred from the evalua-
tion staff to court personnel. Since control group assignments had been
completed, all eligible cases could be diverted to the programs. The court
decided to continue with the same basic eligibility requirements and to dis-
tribute eligible cases to the three programs as their capacities permitted. Pro-
gram capacity had actually increased by then due to an expansion of one
of the programs.
The court recommended commitment for 729 cases in 1985, and 44 percent
were determined to be eligible for intensive supervision-a percentage almost
identical to the proportion deemed eligible in 1984. The number of youths
assigned to the programs jumped to 273, although an increase in rehearings
prevented one in five of these youths from actually entering the programs.
Still, 219 youths entered the programs in 1985, constituting 30 percent of
all cases. The increased use of intensive supervision held the actual com-
mitment rate to 510 that year, despite the growth in commitment recom-
mendations.
In 1986, several changes combined to increase the rate of actual com-
mitments. Commitment recommendations grew by 73 (to 802), but ac-
tual commitments rose by 142 to a total of 652 for the year, nearly matching
the pre-program levels of 1981 and 1982. Proportionally fewer cases were
deemed eligible in 1986, about 38 percent versus approximately 43 percent
in the two previous years. Not all eligible youths were assigned, and there
was a large discrepancy between those assigned (33 percent) and those ac-
tually entering the programs (19 percent). A large increase in rehearings
(to 113 cases) prevented over 40 percent of the youths assigned to the
programs from entering. Lack of program capacity was cited as the reason
an additional 40 eligible youths were not assigned to the programs.
The lack of program capacity and the dramatic increase in rehearings en-
couraged the court to exercise more discretion in eligibility screenings. One
way to reduce diversions and rehearings was to screen out potentially resistant
families. The court’s case files contained information about the youth’s fami-
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ly situation or other factors that might lead one to question their amenability
to an alternative, home-based program. Increasingly, youths meeting the
original eligibility requirements were declared ineligible for diversion due
to &dquo;chronic home truancy,&dquo; &dquo;high potential for future delinquency,&dquo; or &dquo;chaotic
family environment.&dquo; Thus, eligibility decisions began to be based on a
combination of explicit criteria and clinical judgment. As a result, 110 cases
were deemed ineligible for &dquo;miscellaneous&dquo; reasons in 1986 and the popula-
tion served by the programs became a still smaller proportion of those or-
dinarily committed.
With minor modifications, these patterns continued in 1987. The num-
ber of commitment recommendations remained high (807), the eligibility
rate fell further (to about 30 percent) as miscellaneous exclusions climbed
(to 158, or 20 percent of all cases). The programs were operating below
capacity for much of the year, so there was no gap between those eligible
and those assigned.3 However, rehearings declined to 71, or 30 percent of
those assigned. As a result, the number of youths actually entering the
programs rose to 169, producing a total of 638 actual commitments in 1987.
One of the reasons for the reduction in rehearings was the reintroduction of
the parental-refusal option prior to program assignment. The reduction
in rehearings from 14 percent in 1986 to nine percent in 1987 is nearly
accounted for by the five percent parental refusal rate in 1987.
Figure 1 depicts the combined effect of these dynamics. The top line traces
the number of commitment recommendations screened for the programs
each year 4 The next line plots the actual commitments; the rise in 1986 is
apparent. The pattern through 1985 demonstrates the potential of the alter-
native programs to reduce commitments. By that year, the programs had
expanded their capacity, and no more eligible youths were being committed
Figure 1
154
as part of the evaluation’s control group. In other words, commitments were
being reduced to the maximum extent possible by the use of the alternative
programs. In 1986, commitment recommendations increased, but the number
of actual commitments rose more dramatically.
The rest of Figure 1 shows how discretionary ineligibility decisions
and rehearings contributed to the under-utilization of intensive supervision
in 1986 and 1987. The two dashed lines portray the effect of discretion-
ary ineligibility decisions. The upper line shows the number of eligible
cases plus the miscellaneous ineligibles and suggests the number who would
have been eligible based solely upon the original criteria. The lower dashed
line shows only those who were in fact deemed eligible. The widening space
between the dashed lines represents the extent to which discretion limited
eligibility and helped increase commitments beyond the level that would
have followed from the original eligibility criteria. Of course, program capacity
would have had to be expanded to serve the approximately 400 youths who
could have been eligible in 1986 and 1987.
The bottom two lines depict rehearings-the difference between the num-
ber of youths assigned to a program (the upper line) and the number that ac-
tually entered one (lower line). The space between these lines
expands markedly in 1986 before contracting slightly in 1987. After discre-
tionary ineligibility lowered the pool of potential program clients, rehear-
ings further reduced it to the point that the programs were operating well
below capacity.
Discussion
The intensive supervision programs initially allowed many Wayne Coun-
ty youths who otherwise would have been committed to be supervised at
home. In terms of recidivism, the evaluation found the programs to be cost-
effective. During the first two years of program operation, cases were drawn
from the defined target population and their outcomes over a two-year fol-
low-up period were compared with those of the randomly assigned control
group. There were no major recidivism differences between the in-home
program youths and the control group, either in terms of official charges or
self-reported offenses.5 During those first two years, the programs enabled
the court to reduce the number of commitments as intended.
Unfortunately, later years saw a gradual attenuation of the programs’ im-
pact. The programs gradually began to supplement, rather than substitute for
commitment. One might argue that an increase in the incidence or seriousness
of juvenile crime brought a larger number of serious cases before the court.
Perhaps without the programs, the system would have faced the necessity
of committing even more youths each year. This explanation has been ad-
vanced in other evaluations of alternative correctional programs (Jones, 1990).
The information presented above regarding the volume of petitions suggests
that such an hypothesis cannot account for all of the observed increase in
initial commitment recommendations. The analysis took petition volume
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and the relative proportion of serious cases into account and still found that
commitments exceeded expectations.
As commitment recommendations gradually increased, the criteria
for diversion changed such that an ever decreasing proportion of other-
wise eligible youths actually entered the intensive supervision programs.
In principle, there were as many as 400 youths per year who met the
original eligibility criteria and who might have been suitable for intensive su-
pervision. Instead of reducing commitments and expanding the
programs’ capacity to meet this potential, the system acted to limit the pool
of commitment cases that could be diverted to the programs. The number
of commitments returned to almost pre-program levels while intensive su-
pervision was used for many youths who previously might not have been
committed and most likely would have been supervised by regular probation.
The tendency of the justice system to use alternative programs as sup-
plements rather than substitutes is often referred to as net widening (e.g.
Austin & Krisberg, 1981; Cohen, 1985; Decker, 1985; Ezell, 1989; Klein,
1979; Polk, 1987). Intensive supervision programs are often promoted as
alternatives to incarceration. As alternatives, they can reap great benefits.
However, they must draw their clientele from the offender population likely
to be in the net. When they draw instead upon those just outside the net-
offenders who would not have been considered for incarceration previously-
the ostensible alternatives do nothing to reduce and may even increase the
scope and costs of the justice system. Regardless of whether net widening
is seen as expanded social control (Blomberg, 1977), or enhanced delivery
of needed services (Binder & Geis, 1984), it is clearly a failure when the
system’s professed goal was to reduce its use of incarceration or commitment.
Other jurisdictions seeking to substitute intensive supervision for residen-
tial placements could learn from the Wayne County experience. The im-
plementation of alternative programs must be monitored to detect
system adaptations and organizational adjustments. The target population
for alternative programs should be carefully defined to encompass a portion
of youths normally headed for residential placement. Eligibility screen-
ing should utilize clear criteria, and program staff should be prepared to ter-
minate successful cases in a timely fashion in order to permit the entry
of new cases. A certain amount of discretion is inevitable, even desirable
in cases with extenuating circumstances, but it should be closely controlled.
The above analysis suggests there were organizational incentives for
the system to behave as it did. The new programs were a valued resource
to the Wayne County juvenile justice system, but maintaining an already
established volume of commitments was at least as valuable. The success
of community-based programming depends upon the determination of policy-
makers and administrators to make such programs function as true alternatives
to out-of-home placement. To do so, they must resist the organizational
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impulse to augment resources and expand operations by widening the net
of intervention.
Notes
1 CYTCIP inherited its program from another agency that was unable to
fulfill its initial contract after several months of operation. CYTCIP gradually
replaced existing staff and revised the program to its own specifications.
2 Eligibility screening excluded only juveniles charged with a violent
offense, those with a history of sever psychiatric disturbance, or those with
no potential home in the community. The evaluation was limited to male
youths since very few females were committed.
3 In response to this under-utilization of the in-home programs, the court
modified some of the explicit eligibility criteria, allowing the diversion of
some youths with violent commitment offenses. In practice, however, this
modification had little impact as only nine such cases had been diverted as
of the end of 1987.
4 Since cases with rehearings appear in court twice and represent an
administrative duplication of cases, they are subtracted from the official num-
ber of screened commitment recommendations.
5 The program youths were more likely to be charged with status offenses
and program violations, but the number of criminal offenses charged against
the two groups (controlling for time at large in the community) was not
significantly different. There was an incapacitative effect since the control
group was incarcerated twice as long on average (13 months) as the program
youths. When at large, however, the criminal behavior of the two groups
was no different (Barton and Butts, 1990).
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